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Holder assails policing for profit 
Attorney general's initiative curbs but does not eliminate controversial asset 
seizure policies 
January 22, 2015 2:00AM ET 
by Lauren Carasik   @LCarasik 
On Jan. 16, outgoing U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced sweeping 
revisions to the federal civil asset forfeiture policy, barring state and local police 
from using federal law to confiscate cash and other property. Under the oft-
criticized equitable sharing program, the federal government “adopts” assets 
seized by state and local law enforcement and then funnels up to 80 percent of 
the value back to the agencies. 
The program invited malfeasance by giving cash-strapped police departments 
incentive to confiscate property believed to be involved in illicit activities even 
when the owners were not accused — much less convicted — of any crime. The 
program’s abuses have garnered bipartisan support for reform, and critics are 
praising Holder’s changes. 
While the improvements are laudable, they will not end the abuse for a number of 
reasons. First, local agencies may continue the programs under state laws. 
Second, Holder did not ban forfeiture for state and federal joint operations. And 
finally, the changes fall short of addressing the how civil forfeiture tramples due 
process rights. 
Perverse incentives 
Initially crafted as a tool for use in admiralty, customs and confiscation of pirate 
bounty, civil forfeiture has been around for centuries. It is distinct from its criminal 
analog, in which assets are seized only after a defendant has been convicted of 
wrongdoing. The practice was reinvigorated in 1985 for use in the drug war, 
intended to deplete illegal profits amassed by gangs and cartels and provide 
funds for law enforcement efforts. Instead, civil forfeiture has evolved into a 
program that often targets the innocent and is driven by profiteering instead of 
justice. 
It has provided a windfall to police departments. Last year a Washington 
Post investigation revealed disturbing statistics: More than $2.5 billion in cash 
was confiscated since 9/11 in nearly 62,000 seizures. State and local law 
enforcement agencies kept $1.7 billion. None of the owners from whom the 
property was confiscated were convicted of a crime. Although civil seizures are 
authorized under state and federal law, in some cases the federal reimbursement 
allowance exceeded the amount agencies were permitted to retain under state 
restrictions. 
The standards for confiscating property were often lower under federal law than 
what states were required to prove. As a result, participation in the program 
enabled local law enforcement agencies to circumvent state safeguards against 
overzealous policing and protections for property owners. 
Allowing law enforcement agencies to profit directly from the 
seizure of assets has encouraged aggressive, self-interested 
policing and caused irreparable harm to many innocent people.  
The federal law prohibits the use of funds for salaries, but limitations on the use 
of confiscated assets are often lax and poorly monitored under state law. Some 
departments have used the confiscated funds to pay for salaries, bonuses, 
equipment and other items deemed useful for their units, including a Zamboni, 
luxury cars, military grade equipment and a margarita machine. Hundreds of 
police departments relied on forfeitures to fund at least 20 percent of their 
operating budgets, according to the Washington Post. 
Illustrating officers’ compromised motives, a leaked training seminar tape for law 
enforcement agencies showed instructors disclosing tips about how to maximize 
the profitability and ease of the seizures. And the focus on confiscation played 
out in the field. For example, aggrieved motorists in presumed drug corridors 
are often pulled over for minor infractions and subjected to shakedowns. The 
“probable cause” justifying the seizure of cash was often flimsy and 
manufactured, such as presuming that anyone carrying large amounts of cash is 
inherently suspect while ignoring the owners’ verifiable explanations. 
The forfeiture process is premised on a quirky legal fiction in which suit is filed 
against the property itself. Those seeking the return of their property can assert 
their innocence, but in most cases they bear the burden of proof. In the Post’s 
investigation, property owners challenged the seizures in fewer than 20 percent 
of cases, though states agreed to return the money in more than 40 percent of 
those challenges. Property owners abandon their assets for a variety of reasons. 
The cost of recovery may exceed the value of the items seized, litigating in a 
state they were merely traveling may be too difficult, and they may fear further 
involvement with law enforcement. Because the matter is not criminal, owners 
are not entitled to free legal assistance and must often pay substantial fees just 
to initiate claims. It can take months or even years for cases to be processed. 
And even for owners who succeed in obtaining the full or partial return of their 
assets, the temporary unavailability of their money can cause irreparable 
damage. 
It is hardly surprising that civil forfeiture has a disproportionate effect on 
minorities. In the 400 court cases the Post examined in which at least some 
money was returned to owners, the majority were black, Latino or from another 
minority group. A 2014 ProPublica report echoed a similar racial bias, 
documenting that the majority of owners seeking the return of their homes 
confiscated in Philadelphia were from poor and minority communities. In some 
cases, those dispossessed of their property were never even suspects. Some of 
the homes were seized because the owners’ children or grandchildren committed 
minor drug offenses, often without their elders’ knowledge. 
To be fair, civil forfeiture has positive aspects: It has provided hundreds of 
millions of dollars for restitution to crime victims and funneled illicit funds away 
from organized crime (though large enterprises are rarely the target of state and 
local efforts). And few would disagree that convicted criminals should not be able 
to keep ill-gotten gains. 
But allowing law enforcement agencies to profit directly from the seizure of 
assets has encouraged aggressive, self-interested policing and caused 
irreparable harm to many innocent people. Holder’s new policy must be bolstered 
by additional safeguards at the state level, including closer oversight, greater 
protections for owners and eliminating incentives by channeling seized funds into 
the state’s general coffers or other departments. But even those reforms fail to 
remedy the concern about the fundamental fairness of confiscating property in 
the absence of a criminal conviction, especially given civil forfeiture’s disparate 
effect on minorities and the poor. 
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